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THE POWER TO SHAPE THE INTERNAL MARKET: 
IMPLICATIONS OF CJEU CASE LAW FOR THE EU’S 
INSTITUTIONAL BALANCE
Vilija Velyvyte*
Summary: This paper is concerned with the implications of CJEU in-
ternal market case law for the balance of powers between the EU 
institutions. It argues that the Court’s case law involving the areas of 
domestic policy reserved by the Treaty predominantly for the compe-
tence of the Member States creates an inter-institutional dynamic that 
restrains the rule-making capacity of the EU legislature. This dynamic 
seems to undermine the EU law principle of institutional balance be-
cause it either (i) prevents EU-level legislative action, or (ii) predeter-
mines its content, or (iii) makes it devoid of practical force through 
expansive judicial interpretation of secondary legislation.  
1 Introduction
The reach of EU law is wider in scope than the EU’s legislative com-
petence because Member States must ensure compliance with EU free 
movement and competition rules, which are interpreted and applied by 
the CJEU (or ‘the Court’), even in policy areas that fall outside the EU 
legislative competence. This situation seems to create a constitutional 
asymmetry of powers1 between the EU legislature and the judiciary. This 
paper aims to show how this asymmetry plays out in practice. It ar-
gues that the Court’s case law creates an inter-institutional dynamic that 
seems to undermine the EU law principle of institutional balance.
This argument is based on an analysis of EU-level legislative devel-
opments (or a lack thereof) taking place in light of the Court’s internal 
market case law involving two areas of domestic social policy which in 
principle fall outside EU legislative competence – healthcare and collec-
tive labour law.2 Despite the Treaty stipulations asserting the prerogative 
*  DPhil in Law Candidate, Brasenose College, University of Oxford. 
1 J Weiler, ‘The Dual Character of Supranationalism’ (1981) 1 YEL 267; F Scharpf, ‘The 
Asymmetry of European Integration or Why the EU Cannot Be a “Social Market Economy”’ 
(2009) KFG Working Paper Series, No 6, Kolleg-Forschergruppe (KFG) The Transforma-
tive Power of Europe, Free University Berlin <http://www.polsoz.fu-berlin.de/en/v/trans-
formeurope/publications/working_paper/WP_06_September_Scharpf1.pdf> accessed 14 
June 2016. 
2 Given the interchangeability in the usage of the terms ‘labour’ and ‘employment’ law in 
some of the academic literature, the author uses the term ‘collective labour law’ to refer to 
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of the Member States to regulate the two policy areas and the explicit ex-
clusion of harmonisation under the respective sectoral legal bases,3 both 
healthcare and collective labour law have been substantially influenced 
by EU law through the judgments of the CJEU interpreting free move-
ment and competition rules.4 The free movement case law has attracted 
particular criticism. The Court’s elaborate definition of the ‘medical ne-
cessity’ test employed in cases concerning the reimbursement of costs 
of medical treatment obtained abroad has been criticised for depriving 
Member States of their autonomy to manage national healthcare budgets 
independently and thus threatening to undermine public policies which 
seek to prioritise patients in most need of care.5 Similarly, the Court’s 
interpretation of the relationship between collective labour rights and 
economic freedoms has been widely claimed to constrain the operation-
al autonomy of trade unions, thus challenging the viability of domestic 
systems of industrial relations.6 Moreover, as a result of the case law, a 
number of social policy issues pertaining to healthcare and collective la-
bour law have been removed from the national regulatory domain, thus 
increasing the role of EU judicial law-making.
Whilst recognising the implications of the case law for national regu-
latory systems, this paper focuses on a less discussed aspect surround-
collective aspects of labour law, as opposed to the individual ones, also known as employ-
ment law.
3 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union [2008] OJ 
C115/49 (TFEU) arts 153, 168. 
4  For similar developments, see the case law on cross-border access to education, eg Case 
C-73/08 Bressol and Chaverot [2009] ECR I-2782, Opinion of AG Sharpston, para 20; AP 
Van der Mei, ‘Free Movement of Students and the Protection of National Educational Inter-
ests: Reflections on Bressol and Chaverot’ (2011) 13 Eur J Migration and L 123. See also the 
case law on sports, eg Case C-415/93 Union Royale Belge Sociétés de Football Association 
and Others v Bosman  [1995] ECR I-4921; SR Weatherill, ‘Bosman Changed Everything: 
The Rise of EC Sports Law’ in M Poiares Maduro and L Azoulai (eds), The Past and Future of 
EU Law: The Classics of EU Law Revisited on the 50th Anniversary of the Rome Treaty (Hart 
Publishing 2010).
5 Case C-372/04 Yvonne Watts v NHS [2006] ECR I-4325 (Watts); C Newdick, ‘Citizenship, 
Free Movement, and Healthcare: Cementing Individual Rights by Corroding Social Solidar-
ity’ (2006) 43 CML Rev 1645, 1650; D Schiek, ‘The EU Constitution of Social Governance 
in an Economic Crisis in Defence of a Transnational Dimension to Social Europe’ (2013) 
20 MJ 195; G Davies, ‘The Process and Side-Effects of Harmonisation of European Welfare 
States’ (2006) NYU Jean Monnet Program Working Paper 2/2006 <http://www.jeanmon-
netprogram.org/papers/06/060201.pdf> accessed 7 June 2014.
6 Case C-438/05 International Transport Workers’ Federation and Finnish Seamen’s Union 
v Viking Line [2007] ECR I-10779 (Viking); Case C-341/05 Laval v Svenska Byggnadsarbe-
tareförbundet [2007] ECR I-11767 (Laval); Case C-426/11 Mark Alemo-Herron and Others v 
Parkwood Leisure Ltd [2013] ECR 00000 (Alemo-Herron); ACL Davies, ‘Should the EU Have 
the Power to Set Minimum Standards for Collective Labour Rights in the Member States?’ 
in P Alston (ed), Labour Rights as Human Rights (OUP 2005) 206–207; ACL Davies, ‘One 
Step Forward, Two Steps Back? The Viking and Laval Cases in the ECJ’ (2008) 37 ILJ 126, 
143; KD Ewing and J Hendy QC, ‘The Dramatic Implications of Demir and Baykara’ (2010) 
39 ILJ 2, 13.
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ing the case law, namely, how judicial developments have affected the in-
stitutional relationship between the CJEU and the EU’s legislature – the 
Commission, the Parliament, and the Council. The paper is divided into 
four sections. Following this Introduction, Section 2 outlines the main 
developments in CJEU case law concerning the intersection of the free 
movement rules, on the one hand, and healthcare and collective labour 
rights, on the other. It also discusses the implications of the case law for 
the regulatory capacity of the Member States. Section 3 introduces the 
concept of institutional balance as a constitutional principle of EU law. 
Section 4 discusses three ways in which the Court’s practice is liable to 
upset this principle.  First, the Court’s judgments may prevent legisla-
tive action at the EU level. Second, the legislature is often incapable of 
reversing the effects of the case law due to the expansive and detailed 
judicial interpretations of secondary legislation in light of the free move-
ment rules. Third, the case law often serves to determine the content of 
EU legislative action. Section 5 concludes.
2 CJEU case law and its implications for national regulatory systems
2.1 Patient mobility: less room for national autonomy – better 
healthcare for EU citizens? 
According to EU rules on cross-border healthcare, as interpreted in 
the case law of the CJEU, any outpatient care to which a patient is enti-
tled under the social security scheme in her home Member State may also 
be obtained in any other Member States without prior authorisation and 
be reimbursed up to the level of reimbursement provided by the patient’s 
home state.7
 
Any inpatient, or hospital, care to which a patient is entitled 
in her home MS may also be obtained elsewhere in the EU, provided that 
the patient has been granted prior authorisation by the authorities in the 
home Member State. This authorisation must be given if the healthcare 
system to which the patient is affiliated cannot provide equally effec-
tive treatment within a medically acceptable time limit. In determining 
whether a treatment which is equally effective can be obtained within an 
acceptable time, national authorities must take into account the circum-
stances pertaining to the medical situation and the clinical needs of the 
person concerned, such as the history, probable course of her illness, 
and degree of pain or the nature of disability at the time when the request 
for authorisation was made or renewed.8 If authorisation is granted or 
7 Case C-120/95 Nicolas Decker v Caisse de maladie des employés privés [1998] ECR 
I-01831 (Decker); Case C-158/96 Raymond Kohll v Union des caisses de maladie [1998] 
ECR I-01931 (Kohll); Case C-385/99 Müller-Fauré [2003] ECR I-4509.
8 Case C-157/99 Geraets-Smits and Peerbooms [2001] ECR I-5473, paras 53–55; Müller-
Fauré (n 7) paras 89–90; Watts (n 5) paras 59–61.
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has been unlawfully refused, the patient is entitled to full reimbursement 
of the costs of treatment received abroad, determined in accordance with 
the tariff set by the host state.9 
Essentially every judgment of the CJEU involving cross-border 
healthcare starts with the recognition, in accordance with article 168(7) 
TFEU, that the EU’s action in the field of public health has to respect 
fully the responsibilities of the Member States for the organisation and 
delivery of health services and medical care. In the absence of EU level 
harmonisation in the field, it is for the legislation of each Member State 
to determine the personal scope, conditions of entitlement and range of 
benefits.10 At the same time, article 168(7) does not exclude the possibil-
ity that Member States may be required under other Treaty provisions, 
such as the free movement rules, or measures adopted on the basis of 
these provisions, such as article 22 of Regulation 883/2004 on the co-
ordination of national social security systems,11 to make adjustments to 
national social security systems. These necessary adjustments do not, 
however, undermine Member States’ sovereign powers in the field.12
In line with this logic, the Court emphasises that its interpretation 
of conditions for obtaining treatment abroad in light of EU free move-
ment rules aims to balance EU citizens’ right to cross-border health with 
national concerns relating to the sustainability and financial stability of 
their social security systems.13 This balance is to be achieved by draw-
ing a distinction between, on the one hand, reasonable waiting time for 
receiving medical treatment in the home state and, on the other hand, 
undue delay, or medically unjustifiable waiting time. If the waiting time 
is reasonable, the fact that equally effective treatment is available more 
quickly in another Member State does not suffice to challenge a decision 
to refuse authorisation (and consequently claim reimbursement of the 
costs of treatment received abroad). Otherwise, patient migration would 
be liable to put at risk governments’ planning and rationalisation efforts 
in the healthcare sector, which could create problems of hospital over-
capacity, imbalance in the supply of hospital medical care, and logistical 
and financial wastage.14 However, where the waiting time for adequate 
treatment in the home state exceeds medically justifiable time, according 
to the interpretation of this concept provided by the Court, the granting 
9 Note that reimbursement will be calculated in accordance with the tariff of the home 
Member State when the claim is not based on Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 of the Euro-
pean Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the coordination of social security 
systems [2004] OJ L166/1 (Regulation 883/2004). 
10 See eg Smits and Peerbooms (n 8) para 45.
11 Regulation 883/2004 (n 9).
12 Watts (n 5) para 121.
13 Watts (n 5) para 145; Smits and Peerbooms (n 8) paras 76, 78–79.
14 Smits and Peerbooms (n 8) para 106; Müller-Fauré (n 7) para 91; Watts (n 5) para 71.
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of authorisation and subsequent reimbursement of costs are not consid-
ered to be liable to jeopardise the sustainability of hospital care.15
The position adopted by the Court does not seem to reflect the reali-
ties of the operation of the healthcare sector and does in fact threaten 
to jeopardise the financial sustainability of the national healthcare sys-
tems, thus affecting the accessibility and quality of healthcare. In partic-
ular, the Court’s interpretation of what constitutes a medically necessary 
treatment seems to undermine public policies which seek to prioritise 
patients in most need of care. The medical necessity test is solely focused 
on the examination of the individual situation of the patient, excluding 
any comparative analysis in a broader context, which would take into ac-
count medical needs of other domestic patients. While this approach is 
fairly common in the adjudication of individual rights, it does not seem 
suitable for dealing with complex socioeconomic issues, such as the dis-
tribution of funds allocated for public healthcare. Where the inquiry fo-
cuses on the individual’s circumstances, especially when these circum-
stances relate to serious health issues, ‘every human inclination will be 
to rescue [her] by providing treatment even if its likelihood of success is 
uncertain’.16 However, such inquiry leaves aside those whose treatment 
may be affected as a result.17 Moreover, it allows patients with less urgent 
medical needs to gain priority over patients with more urgent ones, thus 
questioning a system’s fairness and commitment to equality.18  
Since the budget allocated by governments to social healthcare is 
usually not sufficient to allow for the swift provision of treatment to all 
patients, competent authorities make use of the available resources by 
planning and setting priorities.19  Waiting lists, for instance in the British 
NHS, reflect those priorities and are intended to maintain fairness and 
equality between patients who require hospital treatment.20 The Court’s 
focus on the individual case of the patient when determining the neces-
sity of treatment clearly interferes with the prerogative of national gov-
ernments to plan and prioritise healthcare expenditure. Moreover, while 
benefiting the vocal minority of patients, it diverts resources from ‘poorly 
represented, less visible, less articulate groups, typically composed of 
disabled, mentally ill and elderly patients’.21 As a consequence, the wait-
ing time for those groups of patients, with equally, if not more, urgent 
needs, but incapable of travelling abroad, will become longer. To avoid 
15 Smits and Peerbooms (n 8) para 105; Watts (n 5) para 75.
16 Newdick (n 5) 1650.
17 ibid 1650.
18 Watts (n 5) para 42; Newdick (n 5) 1662.
19 Watts (n 5) para 13.
20 ibid, para 14.
21 Newdick (n 5) 1646. See also Schiek (n 5).
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this situation and maintain equal access to hospital care, governments 
would need either to provide additional funding for the healthcare budg-
et, or to restrict the range of treatments available.22 
Moreover, if the frequency of patient mobility were to significantly 
increase, the additional financial pressure would arguably hurt most 
the less economically developed Member States (normally, more recent 
members of the EU), since patients from these countries would be the 
most likely candidates to use the benefits of cross-border healthcare. 
The financial burdens resulting from the poorer Member States having 
to fund expensive treatment received in the richer ones may exacerbate 
the already existing inequities among the national healthcare systems, 
threatening the sustainability of the social security budgets of the less 
developed Member States and thus contributing to further decline in the 
quality of healthcare in their territories.23 Without an EU-level fund for 
balancing the extreme inequalities, patient mobility in the EU may soon-
er or later prove unsustainable.24
2.2 Collectively set labour standards as an obstacle to economic 
freedoms
In its case law on collective labour rights,25 the CJEU asserts that, 
in principle, EU law does not preclude the territorial application of na-
tional legislation or collective agreements laying down employment terms 
and conditions. Member States are also free to define conditions of the 
exercise of collective bargaining and the right to strike. However, in ex-
ercising their competences, Member States have to comply with EU free 
movement rules.26 In the Court’s interpretation, this means that national 
labour laws and EU free movement rules are in a hierarchical relation-
ship, whereby the terms and conditions of employment capable of dis-
suading foreign undertakings from exercising their freedom of establish-
ment or freedom to provide services must be justified as appropriate and 
necessary in light of the objective of the protection of workers.27 Such 
interpretation significantly narrows down the scope of application of na-
22 Watts (n 5) para 42.
23 A Kaczorowska, ‘A Review of the Creation by the European Court of Justice of the Right 
to Effective and Speedy Medical Treatment and its Outcomes’ (2006) 12 Eur L J 345, 366–
367.
24 Kaczorowska (n 23); Davies (n 5) 125–128.
25 See eg Viking (n 6); Laval (n 6); Case C-346/06 Dirk Rüffert v Land Niedersachsen [2008] 
ECR I-01989; Case C-319/06 Commission of the European Communities v Grand Duchy 
of Luxembourg [2008] ECR I-04323; Case C-271/08 Commission v Germany [2010] ECR 
00000; Alemo-Herron (n 6).
26 Viking (n 6) para 40, with further references to Decker (n 7) paras 22–23 and Kohll (n 7) 
paras 18–19.
27 Viking (n 6) paras 72, 73, 75; Laval (n 6) para 57.
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tional labour standards to posted workers and poses a profound chal-
lenge to national systems of industrial relations, thus threatening the 
level of worker protection in the EU. 
The Court’s application of the proportionality test to assess the legal-
ity of strike action, laid down in the seminal Viking and Laval judgments, 
weakens the position of trade unions vis-à-vis foreign employers. On the 
one hand, the CJEU acknowledges that the organisation of collective ac-
tion by trade unions must be regarded as covered by their legal autono-
my.28 And yet, the proportionality review seems to significantly restrict 
that autonomy by narrowing down the permissible objectives of strike 
action to one – securing employment conditions that are under serious 
jeopardy.29 Moreover, the requirement that strike action constitutes the 
least restrictive means in a given situation30 seems to go against the na-
ture of the right to strike and risks compromising the effectiveness of 
collective bargaining and trade union activity more generally.31 Also, this 
test creates a climate of legal uncertainty. Trade unions can no longer 
rely on national law to secure the legality of collective action, while EU 
law makes it conditional on a case-by-case assessment of necessity in 
relation to EU business freedoms, something that is extremely difficult to 
predict.32 At the same time, due to the direct horizontal effect of articles 
49 and 56 TFEU, employers are handed a strong incentive to sue trade 
unions in courts with a promise of pecuniary compensation. As a result, 
trade unions are dissuaded from taking collective action given the risks 
involved,33 which significantly weakens their bargaining power and inhib-
its their ability to protect workers’ interests. 
Furthermore, the Court seems to be reluctant to accept collective 
bargaining as a means of laying down the terms and conditions of em-
ployment. In the view of the Court, collective agreements – with the ex-
ception of those that are universally or generally applicable and lay down 
the nucleus of employment conditions listed in article 3(1) of the Posted 
Workers Directive34 – create too much uncertainty in the legal framework 
28 Viking (n 6) para 35.
29 ibid, paras 77, 81.
30 ibid, paras 87–89.
31 T Novitz, P Germanotta, ‘Globalisation and the Right to Strike: The Case for European-
Level Protection of Secondary Action’ (2002) 18(1) IJCLLIR 67, 68–69; ACL Davies, One Step 
Forward, Two Steps Back (n 6) 143; Ewing and Hendy (n 6) 13.
32 C Barnard, ‘A Proportionate Response to Proportionality in the Field of Collective Ac-
tion’ (2012) 37 ELR 117, 120–121; P Syrpis and T Novitz, ‘Economic and Social Rights in 
Conflict: Political and Judicial Approaches to their Reconciliation’ (2008) 33 EL Rev 411, 
418–419.
33 Syrpis and Novitz (n 32) 418–419; Barnard (n 32) 120–121.
34 Council Directive 96/71/EC concerning the posting of workers in the framework of the 
provision of services [1997] OJ L18/1 (Posted Workers Directive).
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of the transnational provision of services and hence make it excessively 
difficult for employers to determine the obligations they need to comply 
with.35 These agreements cannot therefore be justified either under the 
PWD or under article 56 TFEU. Such a position seems to go against the 
spirit of the Treaty, which has, since Maastricht, affirmed the EU’s com-
mitment to promote social dialogue while emphasising respect for the 
autonomy of social partners and for the diversity of national systems.36 
By constraining the operational autonomy of trade unions and limit-
ing the scope of collective bargaining, the Court challenges the viability 
of European systems of industrial relations, particularly in the Member 
States that rely on autonomous collective bargaining in the implementa-
tion of national social policy, such as the Scandinavian states.37 In the 
Scandinavian model, trade unions in principle have the exclusive respon-
sibility to safeguard rather high-average, flexible levels of wages and em-
ployment conditions for all different categories of employees.38 In the face 
of the Court’s case law, governments must either modify their traditional 
methods of social regulation, or accept the fact that labour standards set 
by trade unions will most likely be rejected by the CJEU. A number of 
countries have already followed the first route, which is problematic in 
light of the lack of EU competence to regulate collective labour law.39 
Finally, the Court’s position seems to reinforce the idea that social 
dumping is an acceptable method for businesses to compete in the Euro-
pean market. The working conditions of migrant workers will be governed 
by labour standards of the least regulative Member State relevant to the 
situation in question, unless higher standards are able to survive the 
high-threshold necessity review, save for the nucleus of rules for mini-
mum protection enshrined in the PWD.40 Such a position encourages reg-
35 Laval (n 6) paras 107, 110. See also Rüffert (n 25) paras 26–29, 39–40.
36 TFEU, arts 151, 152; EC Treaty, arts 136, 138. Also contrast the Viking and Laval judg-
ments with Case C-67/96 Albany [1999] ECR I-5751, paras 59–60.
37 C Joerges and F Rödl, ‘Informal Politics, Formalised Law and the “Social Deficit” of Eu-
ropean Integration: Reflections after the Judgments of the ECJ in Viking and Laval’ (2009) 
15 ELJ 1.
38 J Malmberg, ‘The Impact of the ECJ Judgments in Viking, Laval, Ruffert and Luxem-
bourg on the Practice of Collective Bargaining and the Effectiveness of Social Action’ (2010) 
European Parliament Directorate General for Internal Policies, Policy Department A: Eco-
nomic and Scientific Policy, 7 <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/activities/committees/
studies.do?language=EN> accessed 17 February 2015.
39 J Malmberg and T Sigeman, ‘Industrial Actions and EU Economic Freedoms: The Au-
tonomous Collective Bargaining Model Curtailed by the European Court of Justice’ (2008) 
45 CML Rev 1115; A Bücker and W Warneck (eds), ‘Viking – Laval – Rüffert: Consequences 
and Policy Perspectives’ (2010) ETUI Report 111; M Blauberger, ‘With Luxembourg in Mind 
… The Remaking of National Policies in the Face of ECJ Jurisprudence’ (2012) 19 Journal 
of Eur Public Policy 109, 114–124. 
40 S Deakin, ‘Regulatory Competition in Europe after Laval’ (2008) University of Cambridge 
CBR Working Paper 364/2008, 18 <http://www.cbr.cam.ac.uk/pdf/WP364.pdf> accessed 
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ulatory competition between governments, as well as wage competition 
among businesses and workers.41 While encouraging wage competition 
may be a valid economic policy decision, the Court’s asymmetrical posi-
tion threatens to override the also legitimate aim of Member States wish-
ing to maintain their chosen level of worker protection, challenges the ca-
pacity of new Member States to build their own social models, and risks 
creating a race to the bottom in European labour standards.42 Moreover, 
the legitimacy of judicial decision-making is strained when such extreme-
ly political choices are embedded within adjudication.
3 Institutional balance as a constitutional principle
The remainder of the paper argues that the Court’s case law deviates 
from the principle of institutional balance, which governs the distribution 
of powers among the EU institutions, particularly the Council, the Parlia-
ment, the Commission, the European Council, and the CJEU. The prin-
ciple of institutional balance has been mainly discussed in the academic 
literature in the context of the division of powers between the legislative 
organs of the EU – the Commission, the Council, and the Parliament.43 
Institutional balance requires that EU institutions act within the scope of 
the powers conferred on them by the Treaties (positive obligation) and not 
encroach on the powers assigned to other institutions (negative obliga-
tion). This principle is specific to the EU, but the concept itself is inspired 
by the principle of the separation of powers applicable in the national 
legal orders.44 However, contrary to the principle of the separation of pow-
ers, ‘the aim of the system of the division of powers between the vari-
ous [EU] institutions is [exactly] to ensure that the balance between the 
institutions provided for in the Treaty is maintained, and not to protect 
individuals’ against the abuse of power by the government.45 
21 November 2012; N Hös, ‘The Principle of Proportionality in the Viking and Laval Cas-
es: An Appropriate Standard of Judicial Review?’ (2009) EUI Department of Law Work-
ing Paper 2009/06, 16, 19–20 <http://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/11259/
LAW_2009_06.pdf> accessed 27 July 2013.
41 Deakin (n 40) 14–15, 20–21; Malmberg and Sigeman (n 39) 1116. 
42 ‘Rüffert Case: ETUC Warns that ECJ’s Judgment Is Destructive and Damaging’ (ETUC, 
3 April 2008) <http://www.etuc.org/a/4830> accessed 21 November 2012.
43 P Craig, ‘Democracy and Rule-making within the EC: An Empirical and Normative As-
sessment’ (1997) 3 ELJ 105; Y Devuyst, ‘The European Union’s Institutional Balance After 
the Treaty of Lisbon: “Community Method” and “Democratic Deficit” Reassessed’ (2008) 
39 Georgetown Journal of International Law 249, 306–308; B Smulders and K Eisele, ‘Re-
flections on the Institutional Balance, the Community Method and the Interplay between 
Jurisdictions after Lisbon’ (2012) Research Paper in Law 04 / 2012, College of Europe, 
Department of European Legal Studies <http://aei.pitt.edu/39285/> accessed 10 January 
2016.
44 J-P Jacqué, ‘The Principle of Institutional Balance’ (2004) 21 CML Rev 383, 384.
45 ibid. See also Case C-282/90 Vreugdenhil BV v Commission [1992] ECR I-1937, paras 
20–21.
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The principle of institutional balance has been enshrined in the 
Treaties since the creation of the EEC. Article 4 (1) EEC of Part One of 
the Treaty, titled ‘Principles’, stated that the tasks entrusted to the Com-
munity shall be carried out by its institutions, which ‘shall act within the 
limits of the powers conferred upon [them] by this Treaty’. The current 
version of this provision, article 13 TEU, maintains the wording almost 
identical to the original one and adds that that ‘[t]he institutions shall 
practise mutual sincere cooperation’. 
The content of the principle was fleshed out by the CJEU as early as 
in 1958 in the Meroni judgment,46 where the Court was asked to decide 
to what extent EU institutions may delegate their tasks to regulatory 
agencies. The Court held that the delegation of powers ‘can only relate 
to clearly defined executive powers, the use of which must be entirely 
subject to the supervision of the [delegating authority]’.47 It ruled that the 
balance of powers was characteristic of the institutional structure of the 
Community and required the Community institutions to pursue Com-
munity goals while acting ‘within the limits of their respective powers’.48 
The Court elaborated on the principle in the Chernobyl case,49 which con-
cerned an action for annulment brought by the European Parliament and 
concerning a Council regulation which was allegedly adopted using the 
wrong legal basis and failing to involve the Parliament through the coop-
eration procedure. The Treaties did not contain a provision allowing the 
Parliament to bring an action for annulment in this situation. Regardless, 
the Court ruled: 
The Treaties set up a system for distributing powers among the 
different Community institutions, assigning to each institution 
its own role in the institutional structure of the Community and 
the accomplishment of the tasks entrusted to the Community. 
Observance of the institutional balance means that each of the 
institutions must exercise its powers with due regard for the 
powers of the other institutions. It also requires that it should be 
possible to penalize any breach of that rule which may occur.50
It follows from the judgment that observance of the principle simply 
requires respecting the framework for the distribution of powers among 
the EU institutions as laid down in the Treaties. 
46 Case C-9/56 Meroni & Co, Industrie Metallurgiche, SpA v High Authority of the European 
Coal and Steel Community [1958] ECR 00133 (Meroni).
47 Meroni (n 46) 152.
48 ibid 152.
49 Case C-70/88 European Parliament v Council [1990] ECR I-2041 (Chernobyl).
50 Chernobyl (n 49), paras 21–22, 26–27.
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The question is how one determines the outer limit of the powers 
of the CJEU. Its mandate under article 19 TEU is formulated extremely 
broadly, and the performance of the task of ensuring that the law is 
observed in the interpretation and application of the Treaties certainly 
entails a degree of discretion and autonomy. AG Trstenjak suggested in 
her Opinion in the Audiolux case that the principle of institutional bal-
ance requires the CJEU to respect the rule-making role of the EU leg-
islature and observe ‘the necessary self-restraint in developing general 
principles of EU law which might possibly run counter to the legislature’s 
aims’.51 This implies that the Court ‘may not assume the role of the Com-
munity legislature if a gap in the law can be filled by the Community 
legislature’.52 The approach suggested by AG Trstenjak might not be suit-
able for defining the limits of the Court’s action because the Treaty allows 
overlap between the powers of the Court and the legislature. To illustrate, 
the Court held in Brasserie du Pêcheur that the principle of institutional 
balance did not prevent it from recognising in European law a general 
right to compensation of individuals in the event of breaches of that law.53 
In the context of the present analysis, there is also the question whether 
a gap in law exists at all, and consequently whether the legislature is 
entitled to exercise its rule-making powers. The answer to this question 
seems to be positive. Where the Treaty excludes the adoption of binding 
measures in certain areas pursuant to the sectoral legal bases, as is the 
case with healthcare and collective labour rights,54 those areas can nev-
ertheless be subjected to EU legislative action by having recourse to the 
functionally broad legal bases. 55 In the majority of cases, these will be 
article 114, which authorises the adoption of measures that advance the 
objectives of the internal market, and article 352 TFEU – the ‘flexibility 
51 Case C-101/08 Audiolux SA e.a v Groupe Bruxelles Lambert SA (GBL) and Others and 
Bertelsmann AG and Others [2009] ECR I-09823.
52 ibid, para 107.
53 Joined Cases C-46/93 and C-48/93 Brasserie du Pêcheur SA v Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland and The Queen v Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte: Factortame Ltd and 
others [1996] ECR I-1029, paras 24–27; K Lenaerts and A Verhoeven, ‘Institutional Balance 
as a Guarantee for Democracy in EU Governance’ in C Joerges and R Dehousse (eds), Good 
Governance in Europe’s Integrated Market (OUP 2002) 35, 46.
54 TFEU, arts 5, 6, 153(7), 168. For examples of other policy areas, see TFEU, arts 84, 165, 
167, 173, 195, 196, 197. B Ryan, ‘The Charter and Collective Labour Law’ in TK Hervey and 
J Kenner (eds), Economic and Social Rights Under the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights – a 
Legal Perspective (Hart Publishing 2003) 67–68, 84–85.
55 Case C-491/01 Rv Secretary of State ex parte BAT and Imperial Tobacco [2002] ECR 
I-11543, paras 84, 86, 106, 123 (Tobacco Advertising); Case C-380/03 Germany v Coun-
cil and European Parliament (Tobacco Advertising II) [2006] ECR I-11573, para 42; 
Case C-58/08 Vodafone, O2 et al v Secretary of State [2010] ECR I-04999; Case C-210/03 
Swedish Match [2004] ECR I-11893; Cases  C-154/04  and  C-155/04 Alliance for Natu-
ral Health v Secretary of State for Health [2005] ECR I-6451, para 30; S Weatherill, ‘The 
Limits of Legislative Harmonisation Ten Years after Tobacco Advertising: How the Court’s 
Case Law Has Become a “Drafting Guide”’ (2011) 12 German Law Journal 827.
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clause’. Moreover, the Court holds that the exercise of legislative powers 
on the basis of article 114 entails a broad margin of discretion on behalf 
of the legislature.56 It follows that if we were to accept the approach sug-
gested by AG Trstenjak, meaning that the legislature is entitled to fill in 
any existing gaps in the regulation of the broad area of the EU’s internal 
market, as a result the Court might be barred from any sort of interfer-
ence with the legislative mandate. Such a result seems to go against the 
wording of article 19 TEU, which grants the Court the exclusive authority 
to interpret the Treaties. 
Therefore, given the breadth of the Court’s mandate under article 
19 TEU as well as the breadth of the legislative mandate under the func-
tional legal bases, a degree of overlap between the powers of the legis-
lature and the Court seems to be both inevitable and constitutionally 
justified. After all, the Court, as the interpreter of the Treaty, lays down 
the principles that guide the EU legislature in adopting legislative acts.57 
When measuring the institutional balance, the task is thus to determine 
the point when the guidance provided by the Court amounts to a breach 
of institutional balance. As a minimum requirement, it seems to be un-
acceptable for the Court to extend its powers to the detriment of the leg-
islature because such practice would create the legal situation that the 
principle exactly aims to prevent.58 The Court appears to endorse this 
view by holding that the principle of the balance of powers requires that 
‘the practice of [one institution] cannot deprive the other institutions of 
a prerogative granted to them by the treaties themselves’.59 Accordingly, 
article 19 does not entitle the Court to exercise its authority to interpret 
EU law in a way that negates the legislative discretion accorded to the EU 
legislative institutions. Otherwise, the Court would become a substitute 
for the political decision maker, thus infringing the principle of institu-
tional balance.60 
4 CJEU case law upsets institutional balance 
The following analysis demonstrates how CJEU free movement case 
law involving areas of healthcare and collective labour law creates an un-
56 Tobacco Advertising (n 55) paras 84, 86, 106, 123; Tobacco Advertising II (n 55) para 42.
57 See eg an account on the legislative developments in discrimination law following the 
Defrenne judgment: D Sindbjerg Martinsen, An Ever More Powerful Court? The Political Con-
straints of Legal Integration in the European Union (OUP 2015) 67–71.
58 Jacqué (n 44) 384.
59 Case C-149/85 Roger Wybot v Edgar Faure [1986] ECR 02391, para 23.
60 Lenaerts and Verhoeven (n 53) 45–46, referring to Case C-109/75 R National Carbonis-
ing Company Limited v Commission of the European Communities [1975] ECR 01193, para 
8; Case C-415/85 Commission v Ireland  [1988] ECR 3098, paras 8–9; Case C-249/96 Lisa 
Jacqueline Grant v South-West Trains Ltd [1998] ECR I-00621, paras 35–36, 47–48.
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usual inter-institutional dynamic that deprives the legislature of its con-
stitutional prerogative, thus undermining the principle of institutional 
balance. The case law either prevents the EU’s legislature from acting or 
leaves it with a limited choice of legislative options, essentially confined 
to those reaffirming and codifying the Court’s case law. Consequently, 
the Court becomes de facto the ultimate institution that makes EU level 
policy choices binding on the Member States. The legislative measures 
that best illustrate this dynamic are the draft Monti II Regulation,61 the 
Patients’ Rights Directive,62 and the Social Security Regulation of 1971.63 
4.1 The CJEU pre-empts legislative action
Proposed on the basis of article 352, the ‘flexibility clause’, the draft 
Monti II Regulation was intended to provide a legislative response to the 
Court’s interpretation of the relationship between the EU fundamental 
freedoms and the right to strike.64 Although the draft contained a provi-
sion explicitly stating that it was not reversing the Viking and Laval line 
of case law where the CJEU effectively subordinated the right to strike to 
the economic freedoms, it did seem to ‘correct’ the Court’s interpretation 
by explicitly recognising the general equality between the fundamental 
rights and fundamental freedoms in EU law.65  The Proposal stated that 
the exercise of the freedom of establishment and the freedom to 
provide services enshrined in the Treaty shall respect the funda-
mental right to take collective action, including the right or free-
dom to strike, and conversely, the exercise of the fundamental 
right to take collective action, including the right or freedom to 
strike, shall respect these economic freedoms.66 
Furthermore, the proposal highlighted the need for the national 
courts to strike a fair balance in the process of reconciliation of both 
legal values. Monti II thus appears to have established a double pro-
61 European Commission, Proposal for a Council Regulation on the exercise of the right to 
take collective action within the context of the freedom of establishment and the freedom to 
provide services (Monti II) COM (2012) 130 final.
62 Council Directive 2011/24/EU of 9 March 2011 on the application of patients’ rights in 
cross-border healthcare [2011] OJ L88/45, preamble, recital (21) (Patients’ Rights Direc-
tive).
63 Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71 of the Council of 14 June 1971 on the application of social 
security schemes to employed persons and their families moving within the Community 
[1971] OJ L149/2 (Social Security Regulation, 1971)..
64 Monti II (n 61); The Adoptive Parents, ‘The Life of a Death Foretold: The Proposal for a 
Monti II Regulation’ in M Freedland and J Prassl (eds), EU Law in the Member States: Viking, 
Laval and Beyond (Hart Publishing 2014) 95 ff.
65 Monti II (n 61), arts 3.4.2 and 3.4.4; Monti II (n 61), Explanatory Memorandum, 10 <ec.
europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?docId=7480&langId=en> accessed 20 May 2105.
66 Monti II (n 61) art 2.
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portionality review as a means of striking an equitable balance between 
the exercise of the right to strike and the fundamental freedoms,67 thus 
deviating from the sort of balance between the two values adopted by the 
CJEU in Viking and Laval. Monti II was eventually withdrawn due, at 
least officially, to the objections raised by national parliaments regarding 
a breach of subsidiarity and the lack of the EU’s legislative competence to 
regulate collective labour rights. In fact, it was the first time that national 
parliaments had triggered the ‘yellow card’ mechanism established by the 
Lisbon Treaty.68
The fate of Monti II shows that the Court’s rulings may have the ef-
fect of pre-empting any meaningful legislation at the EU level. The more 
controversial the ruling, the more likely this will be the case. Monti II 
sought to achieve a more equitable balance in the relationship between 
the economic freedoms and the right to strike, in this way departing from 
the position adopted by the Court. However, not surprisingly, the pro-
posal raised some controversial reactions from the stakeholders. The 
European Trade Union Confederation rejected the Proposal, claiming it 
was too restrictive on the right to strike, while Business Europe, an as-
sociation representing more than 20 million European companies, was 
also against it, but for an opposite reason: Monti II was less favourable to 
the side of the employers than the Court’s rulings. Finally, protecting the 
national interests, 12 parliaments pulled the ‘yellow card’, claiming that 
the Proposal violated the principle of subsidiarity (as article 153 excludes 
the right to strike from the scope of the EU’s competence) and interfered 
with the national systems of industrial relations.69 Due to the objections 
raised by the national parliaments, the Commission was required to re-
view the proposal, and eventually withdrew it. However, the proposal died 
not because there were real concerns over subsidiarity – after all, the 
draft dealt with the interpretation of the free moment rules in cross-bor-
der situations. As the Commission admitted in a formal letter addressed 
to the national parliaments in response to the raised objections, Monti II 
was withdrawn because it was ‘unlikely to gather the necessary political 
support’ to enable its adoption.70 This is not surprising given that arti-
cle 352 requires a unanimous vote in the Council. In the end, although 
article 352 enabled the adoption of Monti II, the lack of political will for 
the EU to interfere in national industrial systems, as well as the lack of 
consensus between the stakeholders, resulted in the withdrawal of the 
67 Case C-271/08 Commission v Germany [2010] ECR 00000, Opinion of AG Trstenjak.
68 M Goldoni, ‘The Early Warning System and the Monti II Regulation: The Case for a Politi-
cal Interpretation’ (2014) 10 EuConst 90.
69 For a detailed account, see I Cooper, ‘A Yellow Card for the Striker: How National Parlia-
ments Defeated EU Strikes Regulation’ (2013) Network of European Union Centres for Ex-
cellence 5 <http://euce.org/eusa/2013/papers/12g_cooper.pdf> accessed 20 May 2015. 
70 Cooper (n 69) 15; Freedland and Prassl (n 64) 96, 99.
39CYELP 12 [2016] 25-47
proposal. The controversial rulings of the CJEU that triggered the whole 
process remained unchanged. 
On the other hand, the heated debate over Monti II in a way was 
‘much ado about nothing’. Even if adopted, the regulation could in prin-
ciple not have replaced the Court’s particular interpretation of the free 
movement rules. As an interpretation of primary law, it is superior to 
legislation, national or EU-wide, and remains intact as long as the Treaty 
remains unamended. In other words, the rules developed in Viking and 
Laval would have continued to apply, as a matter of law, even if Monti II 
had gained a unanimous vote. The only possible scenario where Monti II 
could have had a real impact after adoption is if the Court was willing to 
temper its position as a sign of respect to the political consensus. How-
ever, it is difficult to predict how likely this outcome would be, especially 
since the Court had in the past gone against the express wishes of the 
legislature even where the legislation had gained unanimous support in 
the Council. The latter phenomenon is discussed in the following section. 
4.2 The Court prevents legislative overturn
Another way in which the Court shapes the institutional dynamic is 
through interpreting existing EU legislation to arrive at a meaning that 
serves the objectives of free movement. The Court’s interpretation of ar-
ticle 22(2) of the Social Security Regulation of 197171 best illustrates this 
tendency. 
The objective of Regulation 1408/71 was to establish rules on the 
coordination of the national social security systems.72  The original word-
ing of the Regulation accorded Member States a considerable margin of 
discretion in making decisions regarding the grant of authorisation to 
receive medical treatment abroad that is subsequently to be reimbursed 
by the patient’s Member State of affiliation. The authorisation could not 
be refused ‘where the treatment in question cannot be provided for the 
person concerned within the territory of the Member State in which he 
resides’. The provision was phrased in rather general and broad terms, 
unqualified by references to either the timing or effectiveness of the treat-
ment. It gave a lot of leeway to the national healthcare authorities to as-
sess whether, in principle, they were capable of providing the treatment 
in question. 
The Court had the opportunity to deliver its interpretation of arti-
cle 22(2) in the Pierik cases,73 concerning a Dutch national who went to 
Germany to receive hydrotherapy treatment. The patient’s request for 
71 Social Security Regulation, 1971 (n 63).
72 ibid, preamble.
73 Case C-117/77 Pierik I [1978] ECR 825; Case C-182/78 Pierik II [1979] ECR 1977.
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reimbursement was refused because hydrotherapy was not among the 
types of treatment covered by Dutch health insurance. The Court held 
that the intention of the Regulation was to give medical requirements 
the decisive role in the decision of the competent authorities to grant 
or refuse the authorisation for treatment abroad. Therefore, authorisa-
tion could not be refused when the foreign treatment was considered 
‘necessary and effective’, even if it was not offered in the health package 
of the state of insurance.74 The Court’s judgments received immediate 
political response at the EU level. Fearing that the sustainability of their 
healthcare budgets might be jeopardised, Member States ‘corrected’ the 
Court’s interpretation by adopting unanimously several amendments to 
the Regulation.75 Article 22 was amended to include a provision expressly 
stating that authorisation cannot be obtained for treatment that is not 
among the benefits provided for by the legislation of the patient’s Member 
State of residence.76 If this condition is fulfilled, prior authorisation could 
not be refused where the patient could not be given adequate treatment 
in her state of affiliation within the time normally necessary for obtaining 
such treatment, taking account of the patient’s state of health and the 
probable course of the disease.77 Also, a new recital was introduced in the 
preamble. Referring to the ‘experience’ of Directive 1408/71, it empha-
sised the importance of extending ‘the discretionary power of an institu-
tion of a Member State … in granting or refusing authorization’. Quite 
apparently, the purpose of the amendments was to regain the prerogative 
that Member States had in making decisions about public healthcare 
before interference in the process by the CJEU. 
In the later judgments, the Court did not challenge the position of 
the Member States regarding the scope of treatment covered by article 22. 
Yet, it did maintain an expansionist interpretation of the article by giving 
a Europeanised meaning to terms that are key in defining the scope of 
the benefits package78 and providing an extremely detailed interpretation 
of the ‘medical necessity’ criterion,79 largely excluding the broader objec-
74 Pierik I (n 73) para 26; Pierik II (n 73) paras 12–13.
75 See eg Council Regulation (EEC) No 2793/81 of 17 September 1981 amending Regula-
tion (EEC) No 1408/71 on the application of social security schemes to employed persons 
and their families moving within the Community and Regulation (EEC) No 574/72 fixing 
the procedure for implementing Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71 [1981] OJ L275, art 22(2) 
(Regulation 2793/81); V Hatzopoulos, ‘Actively Talking to Each Other: The Court and the 
Political Institutions’ in B de Witte, E Muir and M Dawson (eds), Judicial Activism at the 
European Court of Justice (Edward Elgar Publishing 2013) 135; A P Van der Mei, Free Move-
ment of Persons Within the European Community: Cross-Border Access to Public Benefits 
(Hart Publishing 2003) 254–256.
76 Regulation 2793/81 (n 75) preamble and art 22 (1).   
77 ibid.
78 Smits and Peerbooms (n 8) para 94.
79 Watts (n 5).. ra 53, 55, 57 – 61; 2015 () 10ty provisions, such as eciate
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tives of healthcare systems. In this way, once again the Court minimised 
the margin of discretion bestowed on the Member States by the Regula-
tion. 
Moreover, in the Watts judgment, concerning the reimbursement by 
the UK authorities of a hip replacement surgery performed in France, the 
Court unequivocally concluded that there was ‘no reason which seriously 
justifies different interpretations’ of the ‘undue delay’ criterion depend-
ing on whether the context is article 22 of the Social Security Regulation 
or article 49 EC. This meant that the Court’s interpretation of secondary 
law was elevated to the status of primary EU law.80 The intention of the 
legislature expressed in the Social Security Regulation was thus shaped 
and moulded in order to fit the logic of the free movement rules. Moreo-
ver, having based its position on both the Regulation and the Treaty, the 
Court also precluded the possibility of a legislative amendment overturn-
ing this interpretation. Despite political resistance, the Court ended up 
drastically changing the meaning of article 22 of Regulation 1408/71 and 
turned it into an EU-wide binding obligation requiring Member States 
to reimburse the costs of medical treatment received abroad to patients 
whose condition was serious enough to necessitate the treatment.
The Social Security Regulation is not an isolated example of an ex-
pansive, market-oriented interpretation adopted by the CJEU. The widely 
discussed Posted Workers Directive has been interpreted by the Court 
as a maximum harmonisation measure as far as working conditions are 
concerned, regardless of the fact that it was commonly interpreted as a 
minimum harmonisation directive establishing a floor of rights for posted 
workers.81 The terms of the directive itself suggest, though, that it is a 
minimum harmonisation measure. Recital 22 of the preamble empha-
sises that the directive is ‘without prejudice to the law of the Member 
States concerning collective action to defend the interests of trades and 
professions’. In addition, article 3(7) explicitly states that paragraphs 1 
to 6 – that set out the core of the working conditions applicable to posted 
workers – ‘shall not prevent application of terms and conditions that are 
more favourable to workers’.82 Notwithstanding these stipulations, the 
Court concluded in Laval that the level of protection that must be guar-
anteed to workers posted to the territory of the host Member State is 
limited, in principle, to that provided for in article 3.83  
80 ibid, paras 60, 62, 68.
81 Rüffert (n 25) Opinion of AG Bot, para 83; Malmberg (n 38) 7; Malmberg and Sigeman (n 
39) 1116.
82 Council Directive 96/71/EC concerning the posting of workers in the framework of the 
provision of services [1997] OJ L18/1, art 3 (Posted Workers Directive).
83 Laval (n 6) para 81.
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The Court followed the same pattern when interpreting the Public 
Procurement Directive of 2004 (PPD)84 and the Acquired Rights Directive 
(ARD) in other cases concerning collective labour rights.85 Despite the 
fact that the PRD expressly authorises the introduction of social policy 
clauses in public tenders, the CJEU concluded in Rüffert that this did 
not, however, include the application of collective agreements for regu-
lating questions relating to retirement benefits.86 Similarly, in the recent 
Alemo-Herron case, concerning the transfer of undertakings, the Court 
came to the conclusion that the ARD, widely interpreted as a minimum 
harmonisation directive whose main purpose was to protect workers in 
the event of the transfer of undertakings,87 required a balancing between 
the interests of businesses and workers.88 As expected, this balance re-
sulted in prioritising the former over the latter.89 In particular, it required 
that the transferee was in a position allowing it ‘to make adjustments 
and changes necessary to carry on its operations’ after transfer from the 
public sector to the private sector.90 In this connection, the Court held 
that clauses providing dynamic contractual rights clauses (such as those 
referring to applicable collective agreements) are ‘liable to limit consider-
ably the room for manoeuvre necessary for a private transferee’ to make 
such adjustments and changes, hence they are ‘liable to undermine the 
fair balance’ between the interests of the transferee and those of the em-
ployees.91 As a result, the directive was interpreted as precluding the 
enforceability of the dynamic clauses in cases where the transferees were 
not provided with the possibility of participating in the post-transfer ne-
gotiation processes.
84 Council Directive 2004/18/EC on the coordination of procedures for the award of public 
works contracts, public supply contracts and public service contracts [2004] OJ L134/114, 
preamble, recital 46, art 26 (Public Procurement Directive 2004/18/EC); Rüffert (n  25).
85 Council Directive (EC) 23/2001 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States 
relating to the safeguarding of employees’ rights in the event of transfers of undertakings, 
businesses or parts of undertakings or businesses [2001] OJ L82/16 (Acquired Rights Di-
rective).
86 Rüffert (n 25).
87 Acquired Rights Directive (n 85), preamble, art 8. See also Alemo-Herron (n 6), Opinion of 
AG Cruz Villalón, para 20; J Prassl, ‘Freedom of Contract as a General Principle of EU Law? 
Transfers of Undertakings and the Protection of Employer Rights in EU Labour Law: Case 
C-426/11 Alemo-Herron and others v Parkwood Leisure Ltd’ (2013) 42 ILJ 434; S Weath-
erill, ‘Use and Abuse of the EU’s Charter of Fundamental Rights: On the Improper Venera-
tion of “Freedom of Contract”. Judgment of the Court of 18 July 2013: Case C-426/11, 
Mark Alemo-Herron and Others v Parkwood Leisure Ltd’ (2014) 10 ERCL 167. 
88 Acquired Rights Directive (n 85) arts 3(1) and 3(3); Alemo-Herron (n 6) paras 25–27.
89 Alemo-Herron (n 6) paras 28–30.
90 ibid, paras 25–27.
91 Alemo-Herron (n 6) paras 28–29.
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4.3 The Court predetermines the content of legislation
The example of the Patients’ Rights Directive demonstrates that the 
legislative measure that has the greatest likelihood of being successfully 
adopted at the EU level will be the one that essentially replicates the 
Court’s reasoning. 
The adoption of the Patients Rights Directive92 has been seen by 
some as a significant step marking the EU’s involvement in domestic 
healthcare policies of the Member States.93 Adopted on the basis of arti-
cles 114 and 168 TFEU, the directive harmonises national rules on the 
reimbursement of costs of cross-border healthcare. Its adoption was long 
anticipated and came five years after an unsuccessful attempt by the 
Commission to include healthcare services into the Services Directive.94 
The reason why healthcare was excluded from the Services Directive was 
the objection by the health policy stakeholders to the largely economic 
logic embedded in the directive. The stakeholders argued that the coun-
try of origin principle enshrined in the Commission’s initial proposal95 
was not an appropriate means to regulate the healthcare sector, which by 
its nature necessitated a high level of regulatory intervention and control 
by national governments.96 
The legislative proposal dedicated specifically to cross-border health-
care was meant to provide a comprehensive legal framework on matters 
of cross-border healthcare, while also striking a balance between the eco-
nomic and social dimensions pertaining to the sector.97 Not incidentally, 
92 Council Directive 2011/24/EU of 9 March 2011 on the application of patients’ rights in 
cross-border healthcare [2011] OJ L88/45, preamble, recital (21) (Patients’ Rights Direc-
tive).
93 W Sauter, ‘Harmonisation in Healthcare: The EU Patients’ Rights Directive’ (2011) TILEC 
Discussion Paper No 2011-030 <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=1859251> accessed 20 May 2015.
94 Council Directive 2006/123/EC on services in the internal market [2006] OJ L 376/36, 
preamble, recital 23, art 2(2)(f).
95 ibid, art 16. 
96 European Health Policy Forum, ‘Recommendations on Health Services and the Internal 
Market’, 26 May 2005, 15 <http://ec.europa.eu/health/archive/ph_overview/health_fo-
rum/docs/recom_health_services.pdf> accessed 20 May 2015. For an in-depth discussion, 
see W Gekiere, R Baeten and W Palm, ‘Free Movement of Services in the EU and Health 
Care’ in E Mossialos and others (eds), Health Systems Governance in Europe: The Role of 
European Union Law and Policy (CUP 2010) 487–504. 
97 Commission, ‘Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council 
on the application of patients’ rights in cross-border healthcare’ COM (2008) 414 final, Ex-
planatory Memorandum, 2 (Proposal for PRD); Commission, ‘Consultation regarding Com-
munity action on health services’ (Communication) SEC (2006) 1195/4; Committee on the 
Internal Market and Consumer Protection, ‘Motion for a European Parliament Resolution 
on the impact and consequences of the exclusion of health services from the Directive on 
services in the internal market’ (2006/2275(INI)); Sauter (n 93) 7–8; Gekiere, Baeten and 
Palm (n 96) 499–500.
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the proposal was ambitiously titled by the Commission a directive on 
‘Patients’ Rights’, suggesting the creation of EU-wide rights to patients 
– a concept supposed to be much broader in scope than simply the re-
imbursement of cross-border medical treatment.98 The ambition of the 
directive is also evidenced by the reference in the preamble and article 5 
to the ‘overarching values’ common to the health systems across Europe 
– universality, access to good quality care, equity and solidarity. These 
values are to be observed by the national authorities in providing cross-
border treatment.99 The idea itself is based on the Council Conclusions 
on Common Values and Principles in EU Health Systems.100 
The following argues that, despite the ambitious title and some as-
pirational rhetoric about the common values of European healthcare, in 
reality the directive did not do much more than codify the rules already 
developed in the case law of the CJEU, simply adding to the legal certain-
ty of the current regulatory regime. The directive did not create, nor did 
it intend to create, any new rights for patients. The Explanatory Memo-
randum specifies that the objective of the directive is to provide sufficient 
clarity about the rights to be reimbursed for healthcare provided in other 
Member States in order to enable patients to exercise those rights in 
practice, whilst ensuring the observance of the necessary requirements 
for high-quality, safe and efficient healthcare.101 According to recital (10) 
and article 1(1), the directive aims to establish rules for facilitating ac-
cess to safe and high-quality cross-border healthcare and to promote 
cooperation on healthcare between Member States.102 The directive also 
seeks to provide ‘greater legal certainty’ as regards the reimbursement of 
healthcare costs for both patients and healthcare providers. Recital (8) 
seems to clarify what lies behind these stipulations by expressly stating 
that the directive intends ‘to achieve a more general, and also effective, 
application of principles developed by the Court of Justice on a case-by-
case basis’.103 In line with this logic, a number of provisions pointing to 
the aims of the directive, as well as those setting out the rules on reim-
bursement, are qualified by references to the case law of the CJEU, such 
as ‘in accordance with the principles established by the Court of Justice’ 
or ‘according to the constant case-law of the Court of Justice’.104 
98 Sauter (n 93) 8–9.
99 Patients’ Rights Directive (n 92), preamble, recital 12, art 5.
100 Council, ‘Council Conclusions on Common values and principles in European Union 
Health Systems’ [2006] OJ C146/1.
101 Proposal for PRD (n 97), Explanatory Memorandum 7.
102 ibid, recital 10, art 1(1).
103 Patients’ Rights Directive (n 92), preamble, recital 8.
104 ibid, preamble, recitals 10, 12, 27, 38, 40, 42, 44, 46, art 1(1).  
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The terms governing access to and reimbursement of the costs of 
cross-border healthcare seem to replicate the rules developed by the 
Court, often even its exact wording. For example, article 7 obligates the 
Member State of affiliation to cover the costs of cross-border healthcare 
up to the level of costs that would have been assumed by the Member 
State of affiliation had this healthcare been provided in its territory, with-
out exceeding the actual costs of the healthcare received. Article 8 es-
tablishes the general validity of the prior authorisation requirement for 
intramural care and lays down the procedural and substantive require-
ments applicable to the prior authorisation procedure, in accordance 
with the case law of the CJEU. The authorisation cannot be refused if the 
treatment cannot be provided on its territory within a medically justifi-
able time limit, as defined by the Court. 
The so-called new elements introduced by the directive – those go-
ing beyond the rules developed by the CJEU – essentially concern the 
procedural guarantees aimed at ensuring that the system of cross-bor-
der provision of healthcare and subsequent reimbursement is effective 
in practice. The new rules include provisions on access to information, 
transparency of procedures, safety and quality of treatment, and coop-
eration measures, including information exchange through the national 
contact points and the E-Health system.105  Member States are required 
to provide healthcare quality and safety standards to ensure patients’ ac-
cess to the information necessary for making informed choices regarding 
their healthcare, to put in place a complaints procedure for seeking rem-
edies, to respect patients’ privacy when processing personal data, and 
others. Notably, one could argue that these procedural guarantees are 
anyway required under the free movement law, but at least the directive 
makes them concrete. Apart from introducing these guarantees and add-
ing to the clarity and certainty of the regulatory framework, the Patients’ 
Rights Directive does no more than give a legislative expression to the 
substantive rules that have already been in force for a while by virtue of 
the Court’s case law. 
The prolonged adoption history of the PRD illustrates the main prob-
lem with the adoption of EU-level legislative measures when the issues 
at hand are politically sensitive and often characterised by diverse regu-
latory models across the Member States – a problem that Scharpf refers 
to as the ‘joint decision trap’.106 When the Treaty rules require a major-
105 Patients’ Rights Directive (n 92), see eg arts 4, 5, 9(1) 6, 10, 14, 15; Proposal for PRD (n 
97) Explanatory Memorandum 11–12, 17–20.
106 FW Scharpf, ‘The Joint-Decision Trap Revisited’ (2006) 44 Journal of Common Market 
Studies 845; FW Scharpf, ‘Negative and Positive Integration in the Political Economy of 
European Welfare States’ in G Marks and others (eds), Governance in the European Un-
ion (SAGE Publications 1996); FW Scharpf, ‘Community and Autonomy: Multi-level Policy-
making in the European Union’ (1994) 1 Journal of European Public Policy 219.
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ity vote to adopt legislation, Member States with more liberal regimes or 
smaller budgets can gather enough votes to veto legislative initiatives 
that would impose more demanding social regulations. This resistance is 
likely to be supported by national populations, which usually favour the 
continuation of existing systems of social protection and tend to resist 
major structural changes. Scharpf argues:
[v]oters in Britain simply could not accept the high levels of taxa-
tion that sustain the generous Swedish welfare state; Swedish 
families could not live with the low level of social and educational 
services provided in Germany; and German doctors and patients 
would unite in protest against any moves toward a British-style 
National Health Service.107  
Moreover, harmonisation, as a legislative technique, may not offer 
adequate solutions. For instance, as suggested in section 2, what is nec-
essary for patient mobility to be fully effective is an EU budget for cross-
border healthcare. However, as this type of legislative measure does not 
entail harmonisation, the appropriate legal basis to be used would be the 
sectoral one, yet it explicitly excludes the option of binding measures. 
Admittedly, article 352 TFEU could be invoked to adopt innovative legis-
lative solutions, as it empowers the EU to take action in cases where no 
other Treaty provision provides the necessary powers. However, as the 
drafting history of Monti II shows, even if competence under article 352 
could be shown to exist in principle, any meaningful initiative on behalf 
of the Commission could be easily trumped by a single veto.
5 Conclusion
The paper shows how the Court’s case law concerning cross-border 
healthcare and collective labour law encroaches on the scope of the EU’s 
legislative activity to the degree of upsetting the principle of institutional 
balance. The argument advanced in the paper seems also to illustrate a 
broader point that the Court’s interference in policy areas that are re-
served by the Treaty predominantly for the competence of the Member 
States is liable to distort the balance of powers between the EU’s legis-
lature and the judiciary. The policy issues decided by the case law can-
not be further dealt with by EU legislative action because of the consti-
tutional constraints and the ensuing lack of political consensus on the 
matter, general political resistance against the EU’s involvement as such, 
or because the Court can at any time reinterpret the legislative measure 
in light of the primary economic rules in a way that will render EU-level 
107 FW Scharpf, ‘The European Social Model: Coping with the Challenges of Diversity’ (2002) 
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legislative choices devoid of practical force. In these circumstances, leg-
islative measures that have the greatest likelihood of being successfully 
adopted at the EU level are the ones that essentially replicate the Court’s 
case law. This inter-institutional dynamic caused by the Court’s case law 
appears to work to the detriment of the EU legislature. It deprives it of 
its law-making prerogative and thus undermines the EU law principle of 
institutional balance.
